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In this paper we examine the impact of international trade on the absolute and relative wages 
of educated and less-educated workers in Canada over 1993-96. We show that after correcting 
for the relative supply effect of educated to less educated workers the wage differential would 
have been on an upward trend. Moreover, after controlling for other relevant factors 
influencing real wages, trade had a statistically significantly positive impact on the wages of 
both educated and less educated workers. However, the impact on the educated workers was 
four times stronger, roughly the same as the impact of technology on relative wages. We 
show that the observed relationship between trade and the relative wage of educated to less-
educated workers does not fit the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical explanation. The observed 
results are more in line with the Bhagwati-Dehejia hypothesis, which posits a link from trade 
to wages through volatility, labour turnover, and jobless spells. 
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1  Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s the wage differential between skilled and less-skilled 
workers widened in almost all developed countries.  Countries with relatively inflexible 
labour markets experienced an increase in unemployment of less-skilled workers over the 
same period.  Two widely suggested causes of the relative wage change phenomenon are 
trade liberalization and a skill-biased technological change. The former is usually 
assumed to work through the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (SST) that implies that the 
reduction in trade barriers will increase the real return to the factor that is relatively 
abundant in the country, and decrease the real return to the relatively scarce factor. Since 
the North is abundant in skilled labour and the South in unskilled labour, the SST seems 
to provide a prima facie plausible explanation for the observed trends. 
A consensus emerged from the empirical literature that both skilled-biased 
technological change and international trade were affecting relative wages in the same 
direction.  However, although international trade was found to play a role empirically, the 
empirical evidence was not consistent with the SST.  There are two important problems 
that the SST has in explaining wage inequality.  First, although there is convincing 
empirical evidence that increased trade volumes are associated with increased wage 
inequality the SST connects output prices to factor prices and is silent on the relationship 
between trade volumes and wages.  There is no evidence that changes in goods prices 
increased wage inequality.  Second, a number of studies have shown that international 
trade increased wage inequality in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. 
Therefore, there was a need for an alternative explanation that was trade-dependent but 
  1did away with SST.  This is what Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) did in their widely cited 
article, “Freer Trade and Wages of the Unskilled--Is Marx Striking Again?". The 
proposed explanation that they put forward has come to be known in the literature as the 
“Bhagwati-Dehejia hypothesis” (BDH).
1
The BDH is based on the hypothesis that trade liberalization has made many 
industries “footloose” (i.e. small shifts in costs can cause comparative advantage to shift 
suddenly from one country to another), hence making comparative advantage 
“Kaleidoscopic” (i.e. one country may have comparative advantage in X  and another in 
Y one day, and next day it may suddenly be reversed). This in turn leads to increased 
labour turnover. The added turnover means that mobile workers could be accumulating 
less skills causing a reduction or stagnation in the real wages of the affected workers. 
However, it is assumed the less-educated will be affected by more. These factors as a 
whole provide a trade-depended explanation for the observed wage differential between 
educated and less-educated labour. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between trade 
and wages in Canada within a well-grounded theoretical framework.  We present a 
formal theoretical model of the BDH and derive some reduced form estimating equations 
from the model.  The theoretical model predicts a causal relationship between trade 
volumes and relative wages.  The model also provides a mechanism through which trade 
volumes affect relative wages.  The model predicts that high trade volatility increases 
labour turnover and that increased turnover will increase the wage premium of skilled 
over unskilled.  Panel labour force data are the appropriate data for examining turnover 
and wages.  We use the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) data from 1993-
                                                 
1See, for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
  296 to study the impact of trade liberalisation on absolute and relative wages of educated 
and less-educated workers in Canada.  The educated workers consist of people who 
received a university degree, certificate or diploma, ranging from bellow Bachelor’s to 
Ph.D. as defined by the SLID survey. 
We show that after correcting for the relative supply effect of educated to less 
educated workers the wage differential would have been on an upward trend.  Moreover, 
after controlling for some of the most likely factors influencing real wages, it is found 
that trade had a significantly positive impact on the wages of both educated and less 
educated workers. However, the impact on educated workers seems to have been some 
four times stronger, roughly the same as the impact of technology on relative wages. We 
also show that the observed relationship between trade and the relative wage of educated 
to less-educated workers does not fit the SST explanation. Rather, the theoretical 
explanation provided by BDH is more in line with the results observed in this paper. 
Very little research has been conducted examining the issue of trade and wages 
for Canada.  The only paper that explicitly investigates the trade effect alongside the 
technological change effect on the relative wages of non-production (skilled) to 
production (unskilled) workers is that of Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1998). They 
investigate if technological change and trade could have been responsible. Their 
conclusion is that both are at work. Their study, however, is limited in the sense that it 
does not take other factors – particularly the labour supply effect -- into account.  
Unfortunately, like most of the studies done for the U.S., Baldwin and 
Rafiquzzaman as well investigated the causal links between the volume of trade and 
relative wages without grounding their empirical findings in a theoretical framework. It is 
  3also fair to say that their study was geared more toward investigating the impact of 
technology rather than that of trade. This paper, nonetheless, investigates the channels 
through which trade is hypothesized to have caused the wage differential. The by-product 
obtained from investigating the channels such as the impact of trade liberalization on 
labour turnover and of labour turnover on skill accumulation will certainly add to 
important empirical findings about the Canadian labour market. 
Freeman and Needels (1993) and Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998), whose 
main focus is on the relative wage effect of the relative labour supply of educated 
workers in Canada and in the US, argue that neither trade nor technology is the culprit in 
influencing relative wages in either country. They maintain that both over time and 
between countries the variation of rate of growth in relative wages is due to variation in 
the relative supply of more-educated workers alone.  For example, the more conspicuous 
rise in the educated workers’ relative wages in the US and a less-evident rise (or, no rise 
at all) in Canada has more to do with a relatively higher growth in the relative supply of 
educated workers in Canada over the period under investigation than anything else. 
While the adverse effect on the educated workers’ relative wages of their relative 
supply may not be disputed, the finding of a non-increase or even a decrease in the wage 
premium of the educated cannot be counted as an evidence against the positive impact of 
trade liberalization on the wage differential because it could just be that the supply side 
might have overwhelmed the demand side. We find that trade has a significantly positive 
impact on the wages of both educated and less educated workers, however, the impact on 
the educated workers seems to be some four times stronger, roughly the same as the 
impact of technology on relative wages.  Moreover, since the results in this paper show 
  4that the widening of educated/less-educated wage differential doesn’t come even partially 
at the expense of less-educated workers, the result doesn’t fit the Stolper-Samuelson 
theoretical trade explanation. We find that the result is consistent with the explanation 
provided by Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994). 
The remaining of this paper is structured as following: In Section 2 we present the 
model through which we intend to fit the trade explanation of the educated/less-educated 
wage differential into a theoretical framework. In Section 3 we examine the nature of 
education premium in Canada and examines the relationship between trade and the wages 
and wage differential of the educated and the less-educated.  Section 3 also investigates 
the impact of trade volatility on labour turnover and the impact of jobless spells on 
educated/less-educated skill accumulation. Section 4 furnishes the concluding remarks. 
2  The Model: Kaleidoscopic Comparative Advantage and Labor Turnover 
The BDH alternative trade explanation is based on the hypothesis that trade 
liberalization has made many industries “footloose”, hence, making comparative 
advantage “kaleidoscopic”. “Footloose” is a situation in which small shifts in costs can 
cause comparative advantage to shift suddenly from one country to another, while 
“Kaleidoscopic” refers to a situation in which one country may have comparative 
advantage in X and another in Y one day, and next day it may suddenly be reversed.  
This hypothesis above in turn leads to four main consequences:  (1) increased 
ceteris paribus labour turnover; (2) the added turnover means that the mobile less-
educated labour could be accumulating less skills due to the “rolling-stone-gathers-no-
moss” effect, causing a reduction or stagnation in real wages of less educated workers 
(the educated workers are assumed to be shielded from the “rolling-stone-gathers-no-
  5moss-effect” for reasons explained in chapter 2); (3) longer jobless spells for the 
unskilled as against the more skilled, reinforcing the flatter earnings profile for the former 
group; (4) these factors as a whole provide a trade-dependent explanation for the 
observed wage differential between skilled (or educated) and less-skilled (or less-
educated) labour. Bhagwati and Dehejia, nevertheless, admit that they “doubt that this 
alternative explanation can carry the weight that the technical-change (and technological) 
explanation probably does, but it could well be a contributory factor of some, perhaps 
also growing importance”. 
The hypothesis that trade liberalization has made comparative advantage 
“kaleidoscopic” is based on the observed evidence that “the world economy is now 
increasingly integrated and that the convergence of technology among the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and the spread of global 
multinational corporations around the world have brought many modern industries within 
the grasp of countries. Many more industries, therefore, are now ‘footloose’ than before” 
(Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994). The evidence of increasing globalization is documented 
by many researchers such as Baumol, Backman and Wold (1989), Frankel (1994) and 
Dunning, Kogut and Blomstrom (1990).  
One of the most significant characteristics of the globalization of production is the 
extent to which it aids the mobility of assets, notably money capital and innovatory 
capacity, and of intermediate products, notably technology and management skills, across 
national boundaries. This mobility immediately offers the owners of these assets and 
products a wider option in their location of use –  hence described as “footloose”. 
  6Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) sketch a theoretical  model which fits the BDH. 
This is taken up further in Dehejia (1996), who presents a formal model and presents 
numerical simulation results which exemplify the BDH. We are not concerned in this 
paper with theoretical model-building. Rather, we deploy a basic model, reflecting 
conventional wisdom as well as the BHD, which is amenable to testing. 
The basic model we use to motivate our analysis is based on a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) production function of the type used by Bound and Johnson (1992) 
in which the output of each of the J industries (Yj) depends on physical capital intensity 
(kj) and a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator of the i education groups (Li). 
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where φij is the share of workers belonging to education group i hired by industry j.  
Ai(t,T,τ) captures both a technological change which is a function of time t, and learning 
by doing which in turn is a function of potential experience defined as age minus years of 
schooling minus six and is denoted by T and on the job tenure τ.  They all augment the 
services of education group i workers. The elasticity of intra-labour substitution, σ, is 
assumed to be equal across industries.  
Adding the process of learning by doing, however, distinguishes our model from 
the one used by Bound and Johnson. Moreover, we know of no other model that enters so 
explicitly the process of learning by doing the way we have (below). In a competitive 
market in each industry the real wage rate of each type of labour is equal to its marginal 
product so that: 
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Dividing and multiplying (2) by  
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N is a technology argument that is a function of time t, and δi captures learning by doing 
by worker i which can be convex, concave or linear in potential experience T and of on-
the-job-tenure τ depending on whether the partial derivatives of δi with respect to T and τ 
are smaller, greater or equal to zero respectively. l=1,2…M is the number of jobs 
individual i has had over the period of potential experience T. This implies that 
∑ ≤
l
l T τ . E is an operator that can take different values depending on whether an 
individual is educated or less-educated. It, however, is assumed by Bhagwati and Dehejia 
to take a value of 1 if an individual is educated and 0 if less-educated. The assignment of 
the binary values is based on the assumption of "rolling stone gathers no moss effect with 
educated labour being shielded from that effect." Taking the logarithms of (4) we can 
write: 
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  8In equation (5) ηi captures worker type i skilled-biased technological change and δi 
captures the learning by doing of worker i. 
Under free trade, the home and foreign countries’ aggregate demand for the 
output of industry j produced at home (Qj) relative to the same good produced in the 
foreign country is assumed to be:  
Qj=θjPj
-ε         ( 6 )  
Where Pj is the price of good j produced at home relative to that in the foreign 
country; θj is an exogenous demand shift parameter reflecting consumer taste and other 
factors and is assumed to be identical across countries; and ε is the absolute price 
elasticity of product demand for each industry. Substituting (4) and (6) into (3), then 
taking its logarithms yields the following wage equation for workers of type i in any 
given industry j:    
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Equation (7) is quite comprehensive in the sense that it relates the wage rate to 
most of the widely discussed worker-type-specific and firm-specific factors set forth to 
date. For example, the wage rate of worker type i in industry j is positively related to: 1) 
the demand shift for good j (θj); 2) capital intensity in industry j (kj); 3) a positive 
demand shift for worker type i in industry j (φij); 4) worker-type-i skill-biased 
technological change (ηi); 5) learning by doing (δi). It is negatively related to: 6) the 
increase in supply of worker of education type i who has industry j specific skills (Lij); 
  9and 7) the loss of comparative advantage in production of good j at home represented by 
an increase in Pj.  
It is important to note, however, that when σ goes to infinity – that is when labour 
types are perfect substitutes across industries – industry specific demand shocks such as 
changes in θj  and Pj and labour specific supply shocks such as changes in Lij will have a 
vanishingly small impact on the wages of workers within an industry. This is because the 
impact of such shocks will spread out across all types of workers across all industries.  
In order to derive an equation for the relative wage rate of labour of one education 
type to some other education type from equation (3) -- say the relative wage rate of 
labour of education type i to education type k -- we can write:   
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Suppose that worker i is educated and worker k is less-educated. Let’s also 
assume that E takes a value of 1 for worker i and 0 for worker k as suggested above. Then 
Ai(t,τ,T) and Ak(t,τ,T) are reduced to  T t i i δ η + ) (  and    for educated and 
less-educated workers respectively. Let us further assume that labour is immobile across 
countries but freely mobile within a country across industries. This insures that for a 
given potential experience and on-the-job-tenure the wage rate is the same across 
industries for workers of the same education level – the subscript j is therefore discarded 
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i(t,τ,T) and Ak(t,τ,T) and taking logarithms equation (8) 
becomes:   
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Suppose worker i is educated (skilled) and worker k is less educated (less-skilled) 
then there are four important explanations nested in the above equation for the widening 
of skilled to less-skilled workers’ wage differential. The first and second terms on the 
right hand side provide the demand and supply explanations respectively. The demand-
shift in favor of educated workers increases the wage differential, whereas, the increase 
in the relative supply of educated workers decreases it.  
The third term furnishes the skill-biased technological change explanation – that 
is if ηi(t)> ηk(t) the wage differential will increase over time. The fourth and last term on 
the right hand side is the Bhagwati-Dehejia “rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss-effect-with-
skilled-worker-sheilded-from-that-effect” trade dependent explanation as discussed 
above.  
For an illustration let us hold constant the impact of all other variables and 
suppose that δi(τ)=δk(τ)=δτ. Next suppose that during time period T both educated and 
less educated workers experience labour turnovers and resulted jobless spells for a sub-
period  Ť  – so that  Ť=  ∑ −
l
l T τ .  Since educated workers are assumed to be 
unaffected by the turnover and the resulting jobless spell, their log real wage rate due to 
learning by doing will have increased by δT the end of T. Whereas, that of the less-
educated workers will have increased only by δ τl
l ∑ . The log relative wage rate will, 
therefore, have widened by (σ-1)Ť. 
  11A distinguishing feature of this model is that it does not rule out other 
explanations but rather adds the Bhagwati-Dehejia explanation for an additional role just 
as suggested by Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994). We can even further simplify equation (9) 
by following Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) in assuming that the shift in the demand 
for products is felt proportionately by all type of workers and that the ratio of one type of 
labour to another does not change across industries. Equation (9), can be rewritten as:  
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where C is a constant. Numerous testable forms of Equations (10), (9) and (7) are 
essentially what we intend to confront with the data for empirical investigation 
3  The Empirical Analsysis 
The previous section presented a theoretical model which predicts that trade 
volatility increases labour turnover and that increased labour turnover impacts wages.  
The theory predicts that skilled workers out-perform unskilled workers a labour market 
characterized by increased turnover.  We analyse a panel survey of Canadians from 1993-
1996 and take a reduced form approach to empirically examine the empirical veracity of 
the theoretical model.  Before examining the relationship between international trade and 
relative wages in Canada, we examine the impact of changes in the relative supply of 
skilled to unskilled wages.  Second we examine whether trade volumes had an impact on 
relative wages in Canada over this period.  Third we examine whether trade volatility had 
an impact on labour turnover in the Canadian labour market over this period and finally 
we examine whether jobless spells affected relative wages. 
  123.1  The skill premium and labour supply 
First we examine the trend of educated to less-educated (alternatively, skilled to 
less-skilled) workers’ wage differential over the period.  There is some mixed 
evidence on the trend in the skill premium in Canada.  Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 
(1998) find a widening of the education differential but Freeman and Needels (1991) 
argued that the rise was next to nil and Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) present 
evidence of a declining education premium over the same period.  However, the 
evidence is not as mixed as first appears.  Both Freeman et al (1991) and Murphy et 
al (1998) argue that the education premium would have increased significantly were 
it not for a greater growth of the educated labour and a greater strength of the 
Canadian unions in wage-setting.  Therefore, before examining the impact of 
international trade on the wage premium we examine the impact of correcting for the 
supply effect on the wage premium.  
To see how educational earning differentials have evolved over the 1993-96 
period we calculate the average wage premium for educated workers for each year.
2 
In the top panel of Table 1 we present the wage premium of educated to less-
educated workers for all workers, by gender and age (18-34, 35-44 and 45-64 year 
old). The results are mixed.  Columns 1, 3 and 6 show a decline in the average 
education premium of for all workers (0.25%), female workers (2%) and the 45-64 
age group (10.3%). Whereas columns 2, 4 and 5 reveal an increase in the average 
                                                 
2 Although we compute the wage premium using regression analysis and controlling for other determinants 
of wages later in the paper, examining average wage differentials by gender and age provides a useful 
summary of the trends and is similar to the predicted wage premium calculated later in the paper.  The 
average percentage wage premium for workers type i over workers type j in year t is calculated as: 
  13wages of skilled to unskilled workers for males (1.57%), those aged 18-24 years 
(7.11%) and those 25-44 years old (3.34%).  
However, the relative wages of more educated to less educated workers fall 
when the supply of educated workers outpaces its demand.  Murphy, Riddell and 
Romer (1998) found the wage elasticity of the relative labour supply of educated 
workers to be about 0.75 in Canada. That is, holding everything else fixed, if the 
relative labour force of educated workers goes up by 1%, their relative wage rate 
falls by about 0.75%. 
The middle panel in Table 1 shows that over the 1993-96 period a marked 
increase in the relative supply of educated workers, indeed, did occurred. The 
percentage increase in the relative supply of educated workers for all workers, male, 
female, 18-24, 25-34, and 35-44, 45-64 age group workers over the period 1993-
1996 has been 19%, 16%, 22.7%, 9%, 18.6% and 24.8% respectively.  We used the 
Murphy, Riddell and Romer elasticity to calculate the values by which the skill 
premium in Canada has been suppressed due to the relative labour force growth 
reported in the middle panel of Table 1. For example between 1993 and 1994 
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. Multiplying that by 0.75 will give us the 7.53 skill premium 
suppressed due to a relative supply increase. We used this same approach to adjust 
the top panel of Table 1 and estimate what the education premium would have been 
in the absence of a relative supply growth of educated labour. These estimates are 








− , where waget
i is the real wage of workers type i in year t. 
  14reported in the bottom panle of Table 1.  For example, the education premium 
suppressed for all workers in 1994 is 7.53% and the corresponding wage premium in 
the top panel of Table 1 is 47.18%.  Thus the education premium for all workers in 
1994 in the absence of a relative supply change is 7.53+47.18=54.71 – a value 
reported in the bottom panel of Table 7 in the cell for all workers and 1994.    
As seen in the last row of the bottom panel of Table 1, the labor force 
adjusted skill premium increased over the 1993-1996 period for all workers as a 
whole and for every category of workers individually except for workers aged 45+. 
Notice that the increase in the skill premium is higher for male workers than that for 
female workers: 3.1% for men as opposed to 1.4% for women. Secondly, the 
increase in the skill premium decreases for higher age groups (i.e. from 10.2% to 
3.1% to –7.8% respectively).  This perhaps is due to one of the two phenomena: 1) it 
is the more recent or more modern and technical education that drives the education 
premium up and that older educated workers do not benefit from this trend; or 2) the 
older less-educated workers are more protected by their experience and seniority 
from a decline in their relative wages than their younger counterparts.  Looking at 
the declining education premium of 45+ age group workers it is even possible that 
for older workers experience (rather than education) is getting more and more 
recognized. 
It can be argued that even the adjusted changes in skill premium recorded in the 
bottom panel of Table 1 understate the market shifts against the less-educated if 
shifts in labour market conditions alter their labour utilization as well as their rates of 
pay (Freeman and Needels, 1991). More specifically, the relatively small increase in 
  15skill premiums in Canada may have been offset by smaller utilization differentials 
between less-educated and educated labour.  The relative unemployment rates of 
less-educated to educated workers provides some evidence of utilization rates.  
Table 2 presents the percentage difference in unemployment rates between 
less-educated and educated workers in Canada.  The evidence summarized in Table 
2 shows that the relative employment prospects of less-educated workers worsened 
over the period 1993-1996. It should be noted that the increase in the relative 
unemployment rates for male and younger less-educated workers was more 
dramatic: 17.16% for male, 29.95% and 13.28% for workers aged 18-24 and 25-44 
respectively.  
The evidence in Table 2 is consistent with the proposition that Canada has 
responded to the deteriorating job market for less-educated with a relatively greater 
quantity adjustment than with wage adjustment. Had the price adjustment been left 
loose, the wage premium documented in Table 1 would have been higher, as noted 
by Freeman and Needels (1991).    
An increase in wage differentials reported in Table 1 could be due either to a 
leftward shift in relative supply or a rightward shift in relative demand of educated 
workers, or some combination of both. As shown above over the period the wage 
differential widened and the relative supply actually shifted to the right.  This 
suggests that the change in wage differentials would have been higher in the absence 
of a relative supply change. This suggests that the widening in the educated to less-
educated wage differential could be the work of a positive relative demand shift.  
Trade intensity is one of the factors that has the potential of shifting the relative 
  16demand in favor of the educated workers. In the subsequent section it is precisely 
that what we investigate. 
3.2  The Education (Skill) Premium in Canada 
Educated workers are defined as those who received university degrees, 
certificates or diplomas, ranging from college graduates to Ph.D. Conversely, less-
educated workers include those who did not receive university degrees or diplomas,or, 
certificates or diplomas from community colleges.  
Table 3 presents summery statistics for some of the key variables in the sample 
described above.  It shows that real wages (in constant 1992 dollars deflated in the 
consumer price index) have declined for both educated and less educated workers over 
the four-year period.  More noteworthy is the fact that the relative wages of educated to 
less educated workers have slightly fallen between 1991 and 1994. This is in contrast to 
what have been observed in the United States. However, in Section 3.1 we show that if 
we account for the increasing relative supply of educated to less-educated workers, the 
relative wage rate of the educated to less-educated in Canada would have actually 
increased.  
The years of schooling row of the table reveals that between 1993 and 1996 the 
average years of schooling completed by both educated and less-educated workers has 
increased by some 1% and 3% respectively. This is also reflected by the decreasing 
values for the years of experience row for both types of workers since potential 
experience is defined as age minus six minus years of schooling. This upward trend in 
education acquisition, perhaps, is a response to an increasing demand for more educated 
  17labour represented by a decreasing relative unemployment rate of the educated to less-
educated workers.  
The row on job tenure shows that on the job tenure is decreasing quite 
dramatically for both types of workers, particularly more so for educated workers. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of an increasing turnover due to the emergence of trade-
liberalisation-pushed kaleidoscopic comparative advantage that make industries 
footloose.  However, other factors cannot be ruled out either. 
The important things in the labour supply and unemployment rate rows to look at 
are the relative labour supply and relative unemployment rate of educated to less 
educated workers. As can be noticed the first is rising whereas the latter is falling. In a 
simple demand and supply diagram the first pushes the relative wages of the educated 
workers down; the latter suggests that the sluggish demand for less-skilled workers has 
responded with a quantity adjustment (i.e. higher unemployment) rather than a price 
adjustment (i.e. lower wages). Both of these factors, therefore, imply that the relative real 
wage rate of educated workers would have been a lot higher in their absence. In Section 
3.1 we examined the relative wage of educated to less-educated workers in the absence of 
these two factors.  
Lastly, the full-time/part-time row shows that the ratio has slightly slipped over 
the period 1993-1996. The falling relative full-time/part-time jobs rate is consistent with 
increasing incidences of labour turnover which in turn could be caused (in addition to 
other factors) by trade volatility due to trade liberalisation. The unionisation rate row 
shows that the unionisation rates have fallen for both educated and less-educated 
workers, however, with that of educated workers by more than less-educated workers 
  18(indicated by the falling ratio of educated to less-educated workers’ unionisation rates). 
This, as suggested by some labour market studies, could probably be due to unions’ 
protection of the less-educated workers from external competition. 
3.3  Trade and the Education Premium in Canada 
Little research has been done investigating the changes in wages of educated and 
less-educated workers in Canada but in the literature there is a general consensus that 
there has been a positive shift in relative demand for the educated (or, skilled) workers 
(Gera, Gu and Lin, 1999). The disagreement, nevertheless, surfaces when it comes to 
explaining the factors behind the positive demand shift.  
The two most familiar explanations for a rightward shift in the relative demand 
for skilled workers in Canada are trade liberalization and a skilled-biased technological 
change – the latter being more popular than the first one. To investigate the relative 
contribution of trade and technologies to changes in the educated and less-educated 
workers’ wages and wage differential we run the following multivariate regression:  
 
Wit=α1+β1(TRADEjt)+β1(E*TRADEjt )+π1(TECHj)+ )+π2(E*TECHj)        (11) 
        +η(CAPITALjt)+θXit+µZi+ψYt
 
where Wit  is the real wage rate of worker i in time t; E is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if individual i is educated (i.e. ever received a university degree, certificate or 
diploma, ranging from below Bachelor’s to Ph.D.) and 0 if less-educated (otherwise). 
Since less-educated workers are the reference group, the coefficients on E and any 
continuous variable interacted with E measure the differential effect of being an educated 
worker relative to less-educated worker.  
  19TRADEj is the variable representing trade intensity by 3-digit SIC level (the 
subscript j represents industries) and is equal to total exports plus total imports divided by 
total output by industries. E*TRADEj is TRADEj interacted with E. TECHj is a technology 
variable for industry j. It is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an industry is 
technology-intensive and 0 otherwise. CAPITALj
t is the physical capital intensity in 
industry j in time t. X is a vector of labour-market-specific characteristics such as 
changes in the labour supply and unemployment rates of educated and less-educated 
workers; Z is a vector of individual-specific characteristics such as potential experience, 
on the job tenure, gender, if full time and if unionized; Y controls for a time trend or 
business cycle.  
The results of regression (11) are presented in Table 4. The difference between 
columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are that in the former two we estimate semi-log multivariate 
regressions, whereas, in the latter two we take the log of all variables except the dummy 
variables. In addition, In columns 1 and 3 the variable CAPITAL is not included, 
whereas, in the columns 2 and 4 it is. The data for CAPITAL for 1996 was not available, 
thus, the regressions that include CAPITAL are run on fewer observations.  
The coefficients on TRADE and E*TRADE are positive in all four regressions 
implying that trade has had a positive impact on the real wages of both educated and less-
educated workers. This perhaps is due to trade putting pressure on domestic industries to 
become more competitive and therefore more productive, enhancing the marginal 
productivity of labour. The significantly positive coefficients on E*TRADE support the 
hypothesis that trade widens the educated/less-educated workers’ wage differential.  
  20According to the results in Table 3 a 1% increase in the volume of trade of goods 
to output ratio will widen the educated/less-educated wage gap by about 2% to 3%. 
However, it is important to reiterate that the widening of the educated/less-educated 
workers wage differential doesn’t come at the expense of the less-educated workers as 
both workers benefit from trade. However, in relative terms the educated workers benefit 
by more.  
Moreover, as expected the coefficients on technology are quite significant for 
both educated and less-educated workers and that its impact on the educated is some 
three to four times higher than that of the less-educated. Nevertheless, the magnitude of 
the impact of technology on the relative wages of educated to less-educated workers is  
no more than that of trade. This result is in line with that found by Baldwin and 
Raiquzzaman op cit , however, it is in sharp contrast to that found by Gera, Gu and Lin 
op cit who find that technology has a much more favorable effect on the relative wages 
than trade does.  
Gera, Gu and Lin find strong evidence that advanced technologies are biased 
toward the use of skilled labour and thus conclude that skill-biased technological change 
perhaps is the most important factor in shifting the skilled labor relative demand curve to 
the right. Similarly, Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1998) find both trade and technology as 
contributing factors toward the widening wage differential phenomenon.  As they put it:  
The past twenty years have seen a change in earnings inequality, both in the 
United States and Canada. The debate over the causes of increasing inequality has 
focused on whether it is changes in trade patterns or whether it is technological 
change that is at fault. This paper has demonstrated that both are at work….  
 
The coefficients on all other variables, with the exception of labour supply, are in the 
  21expected direction in all of the regressions. Looking at Table 3, column 1, they could 
be interpreted as following: holding for everything else constant, a year added to 
potential experience raises the real wage of all workers by about 1.8%; a month added 
to on-the-job tenure pushes the real wage up by 0.25%; a full-time job pays an hourly 
wage that is 10% higher than a comparable part-time job; on average men’s wage is 
22% higher than that of women; one percent increase in national unemployment rate 
suppresses real wages by 2.1%; unionized jobs pay 9.5% more than non-unionized; the 
coefficient on capital intensity, as expected, is positive. The result in columns 2, 3 and 
4 is identical to that in column 1 in terms of signs and significance, however, values for 
some variables are slightly different.    
The puzzling part, however, is the positive coefficient on the labour supply: an 
increase in the labour supply pushes real wages up. When we separated the educated and 
less-educated it was found that the positive effect of labour supply on the real wages of 
educated workers is 6.5 times stronger than that of less-educated. This perhaps is a 
support to some sorts of Lucas type positive externality attached to the size of the skilled 
labour stock. However, the positive coefficient on the less-educated labour supply is 
puzzling.   
The result of regression (11) supports the proposition that trade plays a significant 
role in the widening of educated/less-educated wage differential. However, since the 
widening doesn’t come even partially at the expense of less-educated workers the result 
doesn’t fit the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical trade explanation. Instead, below we turn to 
the model we developed in section II to explain the relationship of trade and wages as 
evidenced by the result in this section. 
  223.4  Trade Volatility and Labour Turnover 
In order to investigate the effect of trade volatility on labour  turnover we run 
the following regression:  
TURNOVERit=α1+β1(CVTRADEjt)+β1(E*CVTRADEjt)+π1(TECHj    (12) 
+η(CAPITALjt)+θXit+µZi+ψYt
 
where now TURNOVER is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if worker i 
experiences a labour turnover and 0 otherwise. CVTRADE is the coefficient of 
variation of the TRADE variable, representing trade volatility.  
The results of regression (10) are recorded in Table 5. Like in Table 4, the 
second column of Table 5 includes the variable CAPITAL whereas the first one does 
not. In both columns the coefficients on CVTRADE (coefficient of variation of the 
TRADE variable) are significantly positive implying that the trade variation 
significantly intensifies the incidence of labour turnover.  The result is in line with that 
reported by Heisz (1996) in which it was shown that over the period we suspect trade 
liberalization to have made industries “footloose’ (perhaps, through kaleidoscopic 
comparative advantage) job turnover rates in almost all industries have increased.   
Similarly, Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1994) in their paper, Structural change in the 
Canadian manufacturing sector 1970-1990, report a marked increase in labour 
turnover in all manufacturing industries -- the highest turnover occurring in industries 
that are relatively more exposed to international competition.      
The coefficients on other variables can be interpreted as following. Holding 
everything else constant the incidence of labour turnover is higher among educated 
workers, men and unionized workers; labour turnover rates increases with the intensity 
  23in technology; it falls with potential experience but increases with on-the-job tenure.  
An increase in labour supply also increases labour turnover but higher unemployment 
rate reduces it. Full time workers experience lower incidence of labour turnover than 
part-time workers.  
3.5  Jobless Spells and the Educated/less-educated Relative Wages 
In Section 6 it was shown that increasing trade volatility intensifies labour 
turnover (or jobless spell). In this section we check if the length of jobless spell slows 
down skill accumulation of less-educated workers by more than that of the educated as 
suggested by Bhagwati and Dehejia.  
To investigate the impact of increased labour turnover and jobless spell on skill 
accumulation and hence on growth profile of relative wage rates we confront the 
regression equation (7) with the data using the Instrumental Variable Estimation 
technique
3. The results are presented in Table 6.  As in Tables 4 and 5, the second column 
of Table 6 includes the variable CAPITAL whereas the first one does not. The 
significantly positive differential impact of potential experience (the coefficients on 
E*EXP – i.e. Ψ2's) on the wages of educated workers is what was hypothesized. 
However, the positive coefficients on E*TR (ρ2's) are contrary to what was suggested a 
priori. This perhaps implies that either, unlike we suggested, it is the educated workers 
whose knowledge is more industry specific, or that the econometric estimators employed 
are not fitting the type of data being utilized.   
One of the problems inherent in panel data is heterogeneity.  Although in Table 6 
we control for observed heterogeneity among workers, we do not do so for unobserved 
  24heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity is a time-invariant latent individual effect 
correlated with the explanatory variables. If there is no unobserved heterogeneity present 
in the data then the result obtained from regression (7) would be unbiased and consistent, 
otherwise it won’t be
4 (Greene 1997). However, with a panel data it is likely the case that 
the data is tormented by it
5. For example, a higher wage rate associated with higher 
tenure may not be due entirely to skill a worker accumulates through on-the-job-learning-
by-doing but it might be due to his/her latent individual specific ability, and because of 
that ability the worker may have a longer tenure on the job in the first place. The same 
argument goes for education: the fact that an educated worker commands a higher wage 
rate may not be due to his/her high education but rather to his/her individual specific 
ability which probably also has helped him/her to achieve higher education.  
One way of correcting for unobservable heterogeneity is the Fixed Effect 
approach
6. This eliminates the individual effects in the sample by transforming the data 
into deviations from individual means and, therefore, is dubbed the Within Group 












t is the wage rate 
of an individual in group i in time t and Wi* is the mean wage of an individual belonging 
to group i. TENUREi
t,  TENUREI*,  EXPi
t, and EXPI* have similar interpretation. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The results are based on an Instrumental Variable Estimation approach in which trade and technologies 
are two of the instruments.  
4 Greene 1997. 
5 Hausman and Taylor 1981; Osberg 1986. 
6 Greene 1997; Johnston and DiNardo 1998. 
  25coefficients of (13) are of a different scale, however, their interpretations are similar to 
that of regression (7).  
The results of equation (13) are presented in Table 7, column 1. The significantly 
positive coefficients on both e*tenure and e*exp make the result identical to that 
obtained from equation (4) and the issue that jobless-spell has dissimilar effect on the 
educated and less educated is therefore not resolve.  However, the issue can be resolved 
by resorting to the regression of equation (8) in which jobless-spell is an explicit variable. 
In Table 7 column 2 we report the WGE Fixed Effect regression result of equation (8) in 
which  spell = SPELLi
t-SPELLi, whereas, SPELLi
t is jobless spell of an individual in 
group i in time t and  SPELLI is the mean jobless spell of group i. The significantly 
negative coefficients on spell and the significantly positive coefficients on E*spell clearly 
are testament to the hypothesis that jobless spell slows down the skill accumulation of 
less-educated workers by more than that of educated workers. 
4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we studied the trend of educated and less-educated workers’ absolute 
and relative wages over the period covered by the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID) data and investigated if they are causally linked to international trade. 
We also provided a trade dependent theoretical explanation for the causal links between 
the two variables: trade and the educated/less-educated wages.  
We showed the widening of educated/less-educated wage differential was an 
occurring phenomenon (albeit not as strong as that in the US or some other developed 
countries) in at least the groups of workers that are more likely to be exposed to 
international competition brought about by trade. We also demonstrated that the 
  26differential would have been a lot higher in the absence of changes in the relative supply 
of educated workers and in the absence of quantity adjustment (increasing relative 
unemployment of less-educated workers) rather than price adjustment (wage changes).  
We identified trade as a significant contributor to the rising education premium 
and showed that its impact on relative wages of educated to less-educated workers was 
just as a great as that of technology. Although the result implicated trade as a possible 
cause of the widening in educated/less-educated wage differential, it was found that trade 
was not necessarily harmful to less-educated workers. The real wages of both type of 
workers respond positively to increased trade liberalization -- it just is that the educated 
benefit by more than the less-educated. This finding would add some valuable 
information for some redistribution or compensation policies that are designed to 
counteract or alleviate the effect of trade liberalization on some workers.  
Moreover, we found that trade volatility (represented by the coefficient of 
variation of the trade variable) to be a statistically significant determinant of labour 
turnover. We found that jobless spells (due to increased labour turnover) have affected 
educated workers more favorably than less educated workers that resulted in the 
widening of their relative compensation. This provided an empirical support for the 
alternative theoretical explanation for trade and wages developed by Bhagwati and 
Dehejia. 
  27Table 1: Average Relative Wages and Employment of Skilled and Less-skilled 
Workers in Canada: 1993-96 
Ratio of Skilled to Less-skilled Average Wages (in percent) 
  All 
workers 





47.37 57.12  42.76 44.27 59.62 
1994  47.18 
 
43.64 52.76  36.23 43.36 59.63 
1995  51.70 
 
50.57 53.99  46.87 46.97 53.80 
1996  50.97 48.95  55.09  49.87 45.51 49.29 
Percentage 
change 96-93 
-0.25 1.57  -2.02  7.11  1.28  -10.32 
5  Relative employment of educated workers 
  All 
workers 
Male Female 18≤Age<25 25≤Age<45 Age≥45 
1993 0.77 
 
0.76 0.79  0.32  1.02  0.73 
1994 0.85 
 
0.82 0.88  0.32  1.12  0.85 
1995 0.89 
 
0.86 0.93  0.33  1.18  0.88 
1996 0.92 
 
0.88 0.97  0.35  1.21  0.91 
Percentage 
change 96 –93 
19.04 16.03  22.68  9.06  18.64  24.79 
Ratio of skilled to less-skilled wages adjusted for the relative supply growth 
(in percentage) 
  All 
workers 
Male Female 18≤Age<25 25≤Age<45 Age≥45 
1993  51.22 
 
47.37 57.12 42.76 44.27 59.62 
1994  54.71 
 
50.30 61.37 37.27 50.59 71.54 
1995  55.33 
 
53.92 57.93 49.26 51.19 56.97 
1996  53.32 
 
50.46 58.49 52.99 47.37 51.81 
Percentage 
change 96-93 
2.095 3.08 1.37  10.22  3.09  -7.82 
Source: authors’ calculation from the SLID data. 
  28Table 2: Percentages by which less-educated unemployment rate exceeds 
that of educated 
  All workers Male  Female 18≤Age<25 25≤Age<45 Age≥45
1993 86.447 
 
85.350 85.714 68.888  90.909  67.355
1994 84.895 
 
85.205 85.797 87.511  90.620  53.666
1995 94.531 
 
99.527 87.692 95.408  103.437  54.414
1996 90.526 
 
100 78.260 89.523  102.985 50.442
Percentage 
change 96-93 
4.71 17.16  -8.69  29.95  13.28  -25.11 
Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS and SLID surveys.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Educated to less-educated Workers 
Variables   1993  1994  1995  1996 
real wage rate  •  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 























•  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 























•  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 






















job tenure  
( years) 
•  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 























•  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 
























•  educated 
   
•  less-educated 
 

























•  educated 
•  less-educated 
















•  male  
•  female 
•  educated 





















Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: author's weighted calculation from the SLID. 
  30 
Table 4: Results of regression (9) with technology specified as the first type.  
 (1) 

























































































































































Rsq 0.3669  0.3699  0.4409  0.4485 
Durbin-Wat 2.103  2.1028  1.395  1.369 
No of obs  19039  11049  15539  8982 
t-ratios in parenthesis.  
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Table 5: Results of regression (10) from Logistic Procedure of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation.  
 (1)  (2) 
 





























































   
No of obs  19083 11067 
Chi-square statistics in parenthesis. 
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Table 6: Results of regression (7). 
 (1) 
Instrumental Variable  Estimates 
(2) 














































































    
Rsq 0.4697  0.4592 
No of obs  9575  16804 
t-ratios in parenthesis.  
  33Table 7: Results of regression (11). 
 (1) 
Fixed-Effect WGE Estimates 
(2) 
Fixed-Effect WGE Estimates 
  












































Spell  ------- -0.006165 
(-8.604) 
spell 
2 ------- 0.000005397 
(5.861) 
E*spell  ------- 0.003607 
(1.761) 
E*spell
2 ------- -0.00000431 
(-2.223) 
 
    
Rsq  0.1752 0.1393 
Durbin-Wat  1.1185 1.3266 
No of obs  85980 28305 
t-ratios in parenthesis.  
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